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FOLLOWING ORDERS: CAMPBELL V. UNITED STATES, 
THE WAIVER OF APPELLATE RIGHTS, AND THE DUTY 
OF COUNSEL 
Jacob Szewczyk+ 
“Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by 
counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other 
rights he may have.”1 
 
On April 23, 2008, the state charged Robert Campbell with participating in a 
mortgage fraud conspiracy.2  Campbell pleaded guilty in return for a favorable 
plea agreement.3  As part of the agreement, he waived his right to appeal his 
conviction.4  On September 20, 2010, pursuant to his plea agreement, Campbell 
was sentenced.5  After sentencing, Campbell changed his mind and asked his 
attorney to file an appeal, but “[n]o notice of appeal was filed.”6 
Less than two months later, Campbell asked the court “to vacate, set aside, or 
correct [his] sentence,” premised on Campbell’s attorney’s failure to file a notice 
of appeal, which Campbell alleged he had ordered his attorney to do.7  The 
district court dismissed “all . . . of Campbell’s claims.”8  Subsequently, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed to hear Campbell’s 
appeal on one issue: “whether Campbell was denied effective assistance of 
                                                 
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.S., 
2010, George Mason University.  The author would like to thank Professor Cara Drinan for her 
expertise and hours of assistance and guidance that allowed him to write this Comment.  In addition, 
the author would like to thank his parents, William and Christine Szewczyk, as well as his siblings 
and the rest of his family, for their endless support.  The author would like to thank his fiancée, 
Christina Lee, for her love, support, edits, and suggestions for this Comment.  Last, but not least, 
the author would like to thank the staff and editors of the Catholic University Law Review for their 
outstanding and tireless work on this, and every, article. 
 1. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (quoting Walter V. Schaefer, 
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)). 
 2. Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 355 (6th Cir. 2008).  Campbell’s participation 
in the fraud consisted of “falsifying mortgage documents, covertly paying borrowers’ closing costs, 
and ‘flip[ping]’ properties bought by a straw purchaser and resold to Campbell at an inflated price.”  
Id. (alteration in original). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. at 356. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 355–56.  Campbell’s motion to vacate was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Id. 
at 356.  28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the federal habeas corpus statute that allows a federal prisoner to 
challenge the constitutionality of his conviction, sentence, or any other collateral attack.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). 
 8. Campbell, 686 F.3d at 356. 
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counsel when his attorney failed to file a requested notice of appeal.”9  The court, 
ultimately, answered in the affirmative, joining the majority of its sister 
circuits.10 
The Supreme Court of the United States recognized the concept of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington.11  In Strickland, the Court 
established a two-pronged test to determine whether an attorney provided 
deficient representation to his client during trial.12  Under the Court’s two-
pronged test, “[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 
deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.”13 
Since the Strickland decision, the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of 
the ineffective assistance of counsel test to encompass a variety of factual 
scenarios.14  Whether counsel’s failure to file a requested appeal, after a 
defendant has waived his right to appeal through a plea bargain, constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel remains unanswered by the Supreme Court.  
Because of this open question, a circuit split has developed with the majority of 
circuits holding that under such circumstances there is a valid ineffective 
                                                 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 360; see Tamar Kaplan-Marans, An Appealing Split: Filing an Appeal After a Plea 
Bargain: Is Counsel Obliged to File a Meritless Appeal?, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1183, 1184–85 
(2009) (“Even though a defendant’s waiver renders an appeal futile and therefore frivolous, counsel 
is still required to file one under the Sixth Amendment.” (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. 
Tapp, 491 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 273 (4th Cir. 
2007); Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2007); Campusano v. United States, 
442 F.3d 770, 777 (2d Cir. 2006); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 794 (11th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2005))). 
 11. 466 U.S. 668, 687–92 (1984). 
 12. See id. (discussing the test for ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 13. Id. at 687; see also id. at 686–91 (providing the reasoning behind the test as well as the 
requirements for establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 14. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (holding that “defense counsel 
has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and 
conditions that may be favorable to the accused”); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012) 
(determining that, to meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test in the context of ineffective 
assistance of counsel resulting in the rejection of a plea-bargain, “a defendant must show that but 
for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have 
been presented to the court [,] . . . that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the 
conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the 
judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed”); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 
(2010) (holding that defense counsel has an obligation to inform a defendant of potential 
immigration-related consequences of a guilty plea); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 474 (2000) 
(addressing a claim that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file 
a notice of appeal). 
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assistance of counsel claim, regardless of whether or not the defendant has 
waived his right to appeal.15  This Comment will address the circuit split. 
This Comment begins with the background and an analysis of Strickland and 
the expansion of the Strickland test.  Next, it analyzes the circuit courts’ split 
opinions.16  This Comment argues that the majority approach is in accord with 
Supreme Court precedent and is the most effective approach for protecting the 
rights of defendants in criminal cases.  Finally, this Comment advocates that 
courts should adopt the Tenth Circuit’s test in United States v. Garrett to balance 
the essential constitutional rights of criminal defendants with the need for 
judicial efficiency. 
I.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: A TOUGH ROAD FOR CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence [sic].”17  The right to the assistance of counsel is so essential that it 
justifies “withhold[ing] from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the 
power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.”18  In the seminal 
1963 case, Gideon v. Wainwright,19 the Supreme Court deemed the Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel so fundamental that it held that 
the right applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.20  Since 
                                                 
 15. See Campbell, 686 F.3d at 355; Poindexter, 492 F.3d at 266; Tapp, 491 F.3d at 266; 
Watson, 493 F.3d at 963–64; Campusano, 442 F.3d at 771–72; Gomez-Diaz, 433 F.3d at 790; 
Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1198; Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1267. 
 16. See e.g., United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 18. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (footnote omitted).  If not afforded the 
assistance of counsel, the accused would face a substantial risk of conviction based solely on the 
fact that he lacks the education needed to prove his innocence.  See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45, 69 (1932).  The essentiality of the assistance of counsel was addressed again in Cronic, where 
the court stated: 
An accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our 
criminal justice system.  Lawyers in criminal cases “are necessities, not luxuries.”  Their 
presence is essential because they are the means through which the other rights of the 
person on trial are secured. Without counsel, the right to a trial itself would be “of little 
avail,” as this Court has recognized repeatedly.  “Of all the rights that an accused person 
has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his 
ability to assert any other rights he may have.” 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1984) (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307–08 (1973); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Powell, 
287 U.S. at 69). 
 19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 20. Id. at 341–45; see also Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections About Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 33 STETSON L. REV. 181, 288–89 (2003) (discussing the important contributions to 
criminal defendants’ rights made by the decision in Gideon). 
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Gideon, the Court has repeatedly expanded the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee 
of the right to assistance of counsel.21 
A.  When Has Counsel Failed His Duty? 
The Constitution requires more than the appointment of counsel.22  In 1970, 
the Supreme Court, in McMann v. Richardson,23 stated that criminal “defendants 
. . . are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.”24  The Court 
developed the meaning of efficacy in its Strickland line of cases. 
In Strickland, the Court established the standard for determining whether a 
defendant’s sentence may be overturned because of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.25  The defendant in Strickland, David Washington, turned himself in 
after a ten-day crime spree that left three people dead.26  The defendant 
confessed in detail to the third homicide and was subsequently indicted for 
kidnapping and murder.27  An experienced attorney was appointed to represent 
the defendant, but the attorney felt the case was hopeless, because, “against [the 
attorney’s] specific advice, [Washington] . . . confessed to the first two 
murders.”28  Ultimately, the defendant pleaded guilty to three homicide charges 
and a kidnapping charge.29 
In preparing for the sentencing hearing, Washington’s attorney neither sought 
out character witnesses other than Washington’s wife and mother, nor did he 
prepare any evidence regarding Washington’s mental or emotional state.30  
                                                 
 21. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment dictates 
that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel applies to juvenile proceedings); Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (determining that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the 
state to provide counsel to an indigent defendant who has an appeal as of right). 
 22. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (“[D]efendants facing felony 
charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.”). 
 23. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
 24. Id. at 771 (emphasis added).  According to the American Bar Association (ABA), the duty 
of defense counsel “is to serve as the accused’s counselor and advocate with courage and devotion 
and to render effective, quality representation.”  ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEF. FUNCTION 4-1.2, at 120 (3d ed. 1993).  See also Bruce Andrew 
Green, Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 
1053, 1057–58 (1980) (discussing the Court’s holding that “recognized that the [S]ixth 
[A]mendment ‘right to the effective assistance of counsel’ precludes not only impediments to 
counsel’s performance imposed by a state or court, but also an inadequate performance by counsel 
unimpaired by state action”). 
 25. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 671 (1984). 
 26. Id. at 671–72. 
 27. Id. at 672. 
 28. Id.  In addition to ignoring this advice, Washington also “waived his right to a jury.”  Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 672–73.  According to the Court, the decision not to pursue these avenues “reflected 
trial counsel’s sense of hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of [Washington’s] 
confessions.”  Id. at 673. 
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Following the defense attorney’s arguments, the judge sentenced the defendant 
to death.31 
Subsequent to the Florida Supreme Court upholding Washington’s 
convictions, he filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal court alleging that he had 
received “ineffective assistance of counsel.”32  After the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit granted partial relief, the State of Florida filed for, and was 
granted, a writ of certiorari.33 
Specifically, the Court “granted certiorari to consider the standards by which 
to judge a contention that the Constitution requires that a criminal judgment be 
overturned because of the actual ineffective assistance of counsel.”34  The Court, 
in recognizing the important role of defense counsel in criminal proceedings, 
created a two-prong test to analyze ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) 
“the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) 
“the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.”35 
The first prong requires a showing that counsel’s performance was so severely 
“deficient” that the defendant did not receive the “‘counsel’ guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”36  This requires a determination of 
whether, under the circumstances, the counsel’s conduct was reasonable.37  
Further, the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel 
provided adequate assistance.38 
Conduct rising to the level of deficient performance includes failing to 
investigate and present mitigating factors in a sentencing proceeding,39 as well 
as “failing to examine court files on [a client’s] prior conviction.”40  Conversely, 
an attorney’s conduct does not rise to the level of deficient performance when 
                                                 
 31. Id. at 674–75.  The judge found multiple aggravating circumstances to justify the death 
sentence.  Id. at 674. 
 32. Id. at 678. 
 33. See id. at 683 (discussing the cases prior history). 
 34. Id. at 684. 
 35. Id. at 687. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 688.  In Strickland and subsequent cases, the Court stated that it uses American Bar 
Association (ABA) standards to determine what constitutes reasonable performance.  See, e.g., 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (“We long have recognized that ‘[p]revailing 
norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides to 
determining what is reasonable . . . .’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688)). 
 38. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to 
investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all circumstances, applying a heavy 
measure of deference to counsel’s judgment.” (emphasis added)). 
 39. See Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 453 (2009) (per curiam) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)) (“Counsel thus failed to uncover and present any evidence of Porter’s 
mental health or mental impairment, his family background, or his military service.  The decision 
not to investigate did not reflect reasonable professional judgment.”). 
 40. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (“[T]he lawyers were deficient in failing 
to examine the court file on [the client’s] prior conviction.”). 
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an attorney advises his client to withdraw his insanity defense, because the Court 
is highly deferential to trial counsel’s strategic choices.41  But, the 
reasonableness of the attorney’s conduct is only one part of the Court’s analysis. 
The second prong requires the defendant to show that counsel’s “deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.”42  To fulfill the second prong, the 
defendant must prove that, but-for the attorney’s poor performance, “the 
factfinder [sic] would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”43  For 
example, prejudice exists when counsel fails to examine prior court documents 
that contained mitigating evidence,44 but not when counsel fails to provide 
mitigating evidence that was mostly duplicative.45  The Court does not often 
make a determination on prejudice, and will typically remand the case to the 
lower court to make such a determination.46 
B.  Expansion of the Strickland Test 
Since creating the rigid Strickland test, the Supreme Court has heard a variety 
of ineffective assistance of counsel cases.47  This analysis will focus on cases 
that apply the Strickland test in the plea context. 
                                                 
 41. See, e.g., Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009) (holding that counsel did 
not provide deficient performance by recommending that the client withdraw a defense that he 
would be unable to establish).  See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (stating that reviewing courts 
must give deference to counsel’s strategy and method of conducting the trial). 
 42. Id. at 687. 
 43. Id. at 695. 
 44. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390 (“If the defense lawyers had looked in the file on Rompilla’s 
prior conviction, it is uncontested they would have found a range of mitigation leads that no other 
source had opened up.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1409 (2011) (explaining that “[t]here is 
no reasonable probability that the additional evidence Pinholster presented in his state habeas 
proceedings would have changed the jury’s verdict”).  Another example of a lack of prejudice is 
when counsel failed to provide his own expert witness but was able to extract the same testimony 
from the state’s expert.  See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 791–92 (2011) (explaining 
that an independent expert witness for defense would not have provided any addition benefit to the 
defendant’s case other than a “theoretical possibility” that the crime was committed by a separate 
party). 
 46. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1487 (2010) (remanding the case to the 
state court for a determination of the prejudice prong); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 390 
(1986) (stating that an evidentiary hearing was required to determine if defendant was prejudiced, 
and deferring that determination to the lower courts). 
 47. See, e.g., Porter v. McCollom, 130 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2009) (addressing defense counsel’s 
failure to perform a thorough investigation for mitigating evidence); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 
162, 164 (2002) (allegation that attorney had a conflict of interests at trial); Kimmelman v. 
Morrison, 447 U.S. 365, 368–69 (1986) (failure to file a motion to suppress evidence allegedly 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
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1.  Ineffective Assistance in the Plea Process 
The first extension of Strickland to the plea process occurred in 1985 in the 
case of Hill v. Lockhart.48  In Hill, the defendant alleged he was provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel because he pleaded guilty based on erroneous 
advice regarding his parole eligibility under the plea.49  For the deficient 
performance prong, the Court reasoned that a plea must be voluntary, therefore, 
a defendant must receive competent advice from his attorney regarding his 
plea.50 
Applying the Strickland test’s “prejudice” prong to the plea process, the Hill 
Court determined that “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the 
defendant must show that there [was] a reasonable probability that but for 
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial.”51  In Hill, the Court only addressed the standards of attorney 
conduct prior to a plea being entered.  However, in a 2000 case, Roe v. Flores-
Ortega,52 the Court addressed the application of the Strickland test to plea 
agreements that had already been accepted.53 
2.  Failing to File a Notice of Appeal After a Plea Agreement Is Reached 
In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, the question presented was whether a valid claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel existed when an attorney failed to file a notice 
of appeal as requested by the defendant after a plea agreement was reached.54  
                                                 
 48. 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).  In a later case, the Court explicitly stated the importance of plea 
agreements: “plea bargains have become . . . central to the administration of the criminal justice 
system.”  See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012); see also 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
& ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 180 (4th ed. 2008) (“In a typical 
year roughly 85% of the federal criminal cases filed end in a guilty plea.  Because defendants often 
have little to gain by simply admitting guilt to the charges as filed, and because there are far more 
cases filed than could possibly be resolved by a full-blown trial, prosecutors routinely offer 
inducements to a defendant to plead guilty.”). 
 49. Hill, 474 U.S. at 53 (“[The defendant] sought federal habeas relief on the ground that his 
court-appointed attorney had failed to advise him that, as a second offender, he was required to 
serve one-half of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole.”). 
 50. Id. at 56 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 
 51. Id. at 59; see also Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The 
Impact on Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 549 (1988) 
(stating that Hill created a new, difficult rule to win an ineffective assistance of counsel case 
regarding the plea process).  Richard Klein further explained that the “[j]ustification for tolerating 
plea bargaining relies on the assumption that a knowledgeable defendant with the advice of 
competent counsel rationally compares the punishment he would receive if he pleads guilty with 
that he would be likely to receive if convicted.”  Id. 
 52. 528 U.S. 470 (2000). 
 53. Id. at 473 (“In this case we must decide the proper framework for evaluating an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, based on counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal without 
respondent’s consent.”). 
 54. Id. 
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The defendant in Flores-Ortega had pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.55  
Despite his attorney making a note to herself about preparing appellate 
documents, no notice of appeal was ever filed.56 
Upon review, the Court held that ineffective assistance of counsel could be 
established “when counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a 
defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken.”57  The Court 
recognized the long-standing rule that disregarding a defendant’s instructions to 
file a notice of appeal is “professionally unreasonable” conduct because the 
defendant “reasonably relies upon counsel to file the necessary notice.”58  
Additionally, because filing a notice of appeal is a “ministerial task,” the “failure 
to file reflects inattention to the defendant’s wishes,”59 and it cannot be justified 
as a “strategic decision.”60 
For the prejudice prong, the Court, in Flores-Ortega, introduced a new 
exception to the presumption that counsel has provided effective assistance.61  
Previous exceptions were recognized where the defendant was denied any 
assistance of counsel,62 when the assistance of counsel was actually or 
constructively denied,63 and when counsel had a conflict of interest.64  Flores-
Ortega involved the denial of the defendant’s right to a proceeding.65  Denying 
the defendant an opportunity to appeal when the defendant wanted to appeal and 
had the right to appeal created a presumption of prejudice.66  In such cases, the 
Court held, the defendant need only “demonstrate that there is a reasonable 
                                                 
 55. Id. at 473. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 484. 
 58. Id. at 477. 
 59. Id.  On the other hand, “a defendant who explicitly tells his attorney not to file an appeal 
plainly cannot later complain that, by following his instructions, his counsel performed deficiently.”  
Id. (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)).  The Court also stated that defense counsel 
is not required to “always consult with the defendant regarding appeals.”  Id. at 480.  Instead, 
“counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when 
there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal . . . or (2) that this 
particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.”  Id. 
 60. Id. at 477. 
 61. See id. at 484 (“[W]e hold that, to show prejudice in these circumstances, a defendant 
must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient failure to 
consult with him about appeal, he would have timely appealed.”). 
 62. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (holding “that a trial is unfair if the 
accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial”). 
 63. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 378 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 & n.25) (explaining the Court’s exceptions to Strickland’s prejudice 
prong). 
 64. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 
335, 345–50 (1980)). 
 65. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483 (recognizing that the case resulted in the “forfeiture of a 
proceeding itself” rather than the usual concern for the reliability of the outcome of a proceeding). 
 66. Id. at 482. 
2015] Following Orders 497 
probability that . . . he would have timely appealed” had it not been for his 
lawyer’s “deficient” performance.67 
Flores-Ortega, although not explicitly stated by the Court, can be understood 
to reaffirm the long-standing proposition that there are certain decisions that 
belong to the defendant in a criminal trial, and trial counsel must further, not 
inhibit, these decisions.  The Court has recognized that the criminal defendant 
has the right to waive a jury trial, regardless of counsel’s personal opinion.68  
The choice to waive the assistance of counsel also belongs to the defendant,69 as 
does the decision to waive a trial all together.70  The decision that counsel 
provides ineffective assistance of counsel when he fails to file a requested appeal 
is a logical affirmation of the distinction between the rights of defendants and 
the obligations of counsel. 
3.  Collateral Consequences Stemming from Plea Agreements 
The Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky71 addressed whether counsel’s 
failure to inform his client about collateral consequences of a plea can constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.72  In Padilla, the defendant alleged that his 
attorney failed to inform him of the potential immigration consequences of his 
guilty plea.73  While the Court chose not to make a decision on whether 
Strickland applied to all collateral consequences, it determined that deportation 
was so critical to a plea that an effective attorney must advise his client of such 
consequences.74  The Court held that an attorney’s failure to inform clients about 
the effects of a guilty plea on the possibility of deportation was professionally 
unreasonable.75 
4.  Recent Expansion of the Strickland Test’s Applicability in the Plea 
Process 
In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Missouri v. Frye76 that “defense counsel 
has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea 
                                                 
 67. Id. at 484. 
 68. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279–80 (1942). 
 69. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975). 
 70. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). 
 71. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 72. Id. at 1481. 
 73. Id. at 1478 (“Padilla claims that his counsel . . . told him that he ‘did not have to worry 
about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.’” (quoting Kentucky v. Padilla, 
253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 74. Id. at 1481–82. 
 75. See id. at 1486 (“Our longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of 
deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on 
families living lawfully in this country demand no less.”). 
 76. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
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on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”77  In Frye, the 
defendant was charged with driving with a revoked license.78  The prosecutor 
sent Frye’s counsel two plea offers, but counsel never communicated the plea 
offers to Frye.79  Without a plea bargain in place, Frye pleaded guilty and was 
sentenced to three years in prison.80 
On review, the Court restated its assertion from Padilla “that ‘the negotiation 
of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.’”81  Because plea 
negotiations are a “critical phase,” the Court found that “defense counsel have 
responsibilities in the plea bargain process . . . that must be met to render the 
adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the 
criminal process at critical stages.”82  Thus, failing to communicate a formal plea 
offer to a client is deficient performance under the first prong of the Strickland 
test.83 
In Frye, the Court stated that in order to satisfy the prejudice prong, the 
defendant must show that there was a high probability that he would have 
accepted the plea bargain if his attorney had presented it to him, and that the 
offered plea bargain would have resulted in a “more favorable” outcome than 
the results of a criminal trial.84  The defendant must also demonstrate a 
“reasonable probability” that both the prosecutor and the judge would have 
accepted the plea bargain and would have implemented its terms.85  Although 
Frye provided a new ground for defendants to prevail under Strickland, it also 
created a new difficulty.  Judges must now read the minds of the prosecutor and 
trial judge, at the time the plea bargain was offered, to determine whether both 
parties would have approved and accepted the plea.86 
In Lafler v. Cooper,87 the Supreme Court addressed the requirements to prove 
prejudice when a defendant rejected a plea bargain based on erroneous “advice 
                                                 
 77. Id. at 1408. 
 78. Id. at 1404.  Frye was charged as a felon because he had three previous convictions for 
the same crime.  Id. 
 79. Id.  No explanation was given in the decision as to why counsel did not provide Frye with 
the prosecutor’s offers.  Id. 
 80. Id. at 1404–05. 
 81. Id. at 1406 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010)). 
 82. Id. at 1407. 
 83. Id. at 1409. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. at 1410 (“In order to complete a showing of Strickland prejudice . . . [defendant] 
must also show that . . . there is a reasonable probability neither the prosecution nor the trial court 
would have prevented the [plea] offer from being accepted or implemented.”). 
 86. See id. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining the majority’s opinion as requiring the 
“process of retrospective crystal-ball gazing posing as legal analysis”). 
 87. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
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of counsel.”88  Anthony Cooper, the defendant, was charged with multiple 
felonies.89  Cooper was offered a plea bargain on three separate occasions and, 
relying on the advice of counsel, rejected all three.90  At trial, Cooper “was 
convicted on all counts and received a mandatory minimum sentence of 185 to 
360 months’ imprisonment.”91 
On review, the Supreme Court did not address the first prong of the Strickland 
test because both sides agreed that defense counsel’s advice to reject the plea 
bargains was deficient performance.92  The Court’s analysis of the prejudice 
prong was dissected into multiple components, which required the defendant to 
show: 
[1] but for the ineffective advice of counsel there [was] a reasonable 
probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court 
. . . [2] that the court would have accepted its terms, and [3] that the 
conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have 
been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were 
imposed.93 
The Court determined that a fair trial does not eliminate the possibility of 
prejudice under Strickland because ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea 
bargain stage may result in a more severe punishment than would have been 
received by accepting the offer.94  While a defendant has no right to be offered 
a plea,95 once a plea is offered, the defendant is entitled to the effective assistance 
of counsel when determining whether or not to accept the offer.96 
                                                 
 88. See id. at 1383 (distinguishing the facts of Frye from the facts at issue in Lafler and noting 
“[t]he instant case comes to the Court with the concession that counsel’s advice with respect to the 
plea offer fell below the standard of adequate assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment”).  In both Frye and Lafler, the Supreme Court “recognize[d] that the choice between 
constitutional modes of adjudication matters . . . so a missed opportunity to accept a plea discount 
. . . is a constitutionally cognizable injury.”  Darryl K. Brown, Lafler, Frye and Our Still-
Unregulated Plea Bargaining System, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 131, 131 (2012). 
 89. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.  “[Cooper] was charged . . . with assault with intent to murder, 
possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, 
misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and for being a habitual offender.”  Id. 
 90. Id.  Cooper alleged that he refused to accept the plea offers, because “his attorney 
convinced him that the prosecution would be unable to establish his intent to murder [the victim] 
because she had been shot below the waist.”  Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1384. 
 93. Id. at 1385.  This wide-range of factors show that “even if unconstitutional representation 
led to a defendant losing the prosecutor’s proffered plea bargain, the court on remand has the 
discretion to impose the same, more severe sentence as the defendant was given after trial.”  Brown, 
supra note 88, at 132. 
 94. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386. 
 95. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). 
 96. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387. 
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C.  Strickland and Appellate Waivers 
1.  The Majority Approach 
The United States Courts of Appeal for the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that defense counsel 
provides ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a notice of appeal 
when instructed to do so, despite the existence of an appellate waiver.97  The 
Sixth Circuit’s discussion in Campbell v. United States98 and the Tenth Circuit’s 
analysis in United States v. Garrett99 are demonstrative of the rationale behind 
the holding. 
In Campbell, Robert Campbell “pleaded guilty . . . [to] conspiracy to commit 
wire and mail fraud.”100  As part of his plea bargain, Campbell waived his right 
to appeal with several very narrow exceptions.101  In a motion to vacate his 
sentence, Campbell alleged that he ordered his counsel to file a notice of appeal, 
but his attorney failed to file the notice.102  After reviewing Supreme Court 
precedents and the rulings of its sister circuits, the Sixth Circuit held that “even 
when a defendant waives all or most of his right to appeal, an attorney who fails 
to file an appeal that a criminal defendant explicitly requests has . . . provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”103  The court determined that Campbell’s 
right, as a criminal defendant, to the effective assistance of counsel was not 
diminished by his initial acceptance of a plea bargain from the state.104  The 
same question was presented in United States v. Garrett.105 
                                                 
 97. See Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 355 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Tapp, 
491 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 265 (4th Cir. 2007); 
Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2007); Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 
770, 771–72 (2d Cir. 2006); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 790 (11th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garrett, 
402 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 98. 686 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 99. 402 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 100. Campbell, 686 F.3d at 355.  
 101. Id. at 355 & n.1 (stating that Campbell could only appeal “any punishment in excess of 
the statutory maximum; . . . any sentence to the extent it exceeds the maximum of the sentencing 
range. . . .  Nothing . . . shall act as a bar to the defendant perfecting any legal remedies defendant 
may otherwise have on appeal or collateral attack respecting claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, voluntariness of this plea and accompanying waivers, or prosecutorial misconduct” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Campbell was not sentenced until two years after his plea, so 
that he could sell several properties he owned in order to pay restitution.  Telephone Interview with 
Thomas Karol, Assistant U.S. Attorney, United States Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 18, 2013). 
 102. Campbell, 686 F.3d at 355–56. 
 103. Id. at 359–60. 
 104. Id. 
 105. 402 F.3d 1262, 1263 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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In Garrett, the defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 
crack cocaine, and waived his right to appeal with limited exceptions.106  A year 
after sentencing, Garrett alleged that he had instructed his counsel to file a notice 
of appeal, which his attorney failed to file, and, therefore, Garrett received 
ineffective assistance of counsel.107  Similar to the Sixth Circuit’s holding in 
Campbell, the Tenth Circuit found that ineffective assistance of counsel could 
be established by counsel’s failure to file a requested notice of appeal.108 
2.  The Minority Approach: A Focus on Judicial Efficiency 
The Seventh Circuit addressed whether counsel’s failure to file a requested 
appeal, after a defendant waived his right to appeal, was ineffective assistance 
of counsel in Nunez v. United States.109  In Nunez, the defendant was “[c]harged 
with multiple [drug] offenses.”110  The prosecutor offered the defendant a plea 
bargain, which he accepted.111  As part of the plea bargain, the defendant agreed 
to waive his right to appeal.112  Nunez challenged his sentence, under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255, alleging that after sentencing he instructed his attorney to file an appeal, 
and that his attorney’s failure to file it constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel.113  The court held that the defendant’s counsel did not provide deficient 
performance by respecting the terms of the plea agreement, and, therefore, the 
defendant could not prevail under the Strickland test.114  Likewise, the Third 
Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. Mabry.115 
In Mabry, James Mabry, the defendant, was charged with multiple felonies.116  
Subsequent to impanelling the jury, “Mabry entered into a written plea 
agreement pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to . . . possession with intent to 
distribute . . . cocaine,” and waived his right to appeal without any exception.117  
Eventually, Mabry filed a collateral attack of his sentence, under 28 U.S.C. § 
                                                 
 106. Id.  The exceptions included any sentence above the statutory maximum and any collateral 
challenge based on a change in Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent.  Id. at 1263 n.2. 
 107. Id. at 1264. 
 108. Id. at 1266; see also Campbell, 686 F.3d at 359. 
 109. 546 F.3d 450, 451–52 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 110. Id. at 453. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  The waiver only allowed Nunez to appeal if “the sentence exceeded the statutory 
maximum or the waiver clause itself should be deemed invalid.”  Id. 
 113. Id. at 451–53. 
 114. See id. at 456 (“[E]ven if Nunez asked his lawyer to file an appeal, counsel did not 
transgress the Constitution by honoring his client’s considered written choice (the waiver) rather 
than his client’s oral second thoughts.  Nunez’s contention flunks both the conduct and the prejudice 
components of ineffective-assistance doctrine.”). 
 115. 536 F.3d 231, 241 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We, therefore, will part ways with the approach taken 
by the majority of courts of appeals. . . . [T]he Nunez opinion of the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit presents the proper focus, namely giving effect to the waiver.”). 
 116. Id. at 233. 
 117. See id. (describing the conditions of Mabry’s plea agreement with the government). 
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2255, arguing that his attorney failed to file an appeal at his instruction.118  As 
opposed to the court in Nunez, the Third Circuit did not find that Mabry failed 
to meet the requirements of Strickland.  Rather, the Third Circuit determined 
that the Strickland test, even though it applies to counsel’s failure to file an 
appeal, “does not apply when there [was] an appellate waiver.”119 
II.  STRICKLAND’S APPLICABILITY TO APPELLATE WAIVERS 
The development of the applicability of Strickland to the plea process 
presented a new question following Flores-Ortega: whether defense counsel 
provides ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a notice of appeal 
where the defendant has waived his right of appeal pursuant to a plea 
agreement.120  The majority of circuits faced with this new question have 
answered in the affirmative.121  Only the Nunez and Mabry courts chose not to 
follow the majority position.122 
A.  The Majority-Approach Circuits Properly Focus Their Analysis on 
Defendants’ Rights 
The majority of the circuits, including the Sixth and Tenth, rely on the logic 
of Strickland and Flores-Ortega.123  Despite the fact that Flores-Ortega 
involved a defendant who did not waive his right to appeal,124 the majority of 
the circuits found the decision applicable to appellate waiver cases, and 
supported this position with persuasive reasoning.125  Campbell demonstrates 
that the reliance on Flores-Ortega is based on sound logical comparisons and 
the similarity of constitutional rights at stake. 
In Campbell, the Sixth Circuit determined that Flores-Ortega’s analytical 
structure could be applied to Campbell’s facts.126  The Campbell court paid 
                                                 
 118. See id. at 235, 239 (stating the procedural history of Mabry’s appeal, as well as the 
arguments he put forward in support of his claim). 
 119. Id. at 241–42, 242 n.14 (discussing the applicability of Strickland to the facts of Mabry). 
 120. See id. at 241–42 (discussing the courts’ application of Flores-Ortega to appellate 
waivers). 
 121. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the minority position). 
 123. See, e.g., Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that the 
presumption of prejudice found in Flores-Ortega was applicable to appellate waivers); United 
States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2005) (determining “[t]he Flores-Ortega 
framework helps with [the present] case”); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 792 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (“The reasoning in Flores-Ortega applies with equal force where, as here, the defendant 
has waived many, but not all, of his appellate rights.”). 
 124. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 488 n.1 (Souter, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (stating that the government did not “claim . . . that Flores-Ortega waived his 
right to appeal as part of his plea agreement”). 
 125. See supra notes 97 & 123 and accompanying text. 
 126. Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 357–58 (6th Cir. 2012) (“In light of the specific 
propositions of law outlining the obligations of a criminal defense attorney at the appeal stage, and 
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particular attention to the time-honored rule “that a lawyer who disregards 
specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner 
that is professionally unreasonable.”127  Under this rule, “for the purpose of the 
Strickland analysis, ‘prejudice must be presumed,’” because the failure to file an 
appeal, after the defendant requested the appeal, “[was] a per se violation of the 
Sixth Amendment.”128  This “per se” determination eliminates the need to 
discuss the Strickland test’s deficient performance prong because the defendant 
has already been completely “deprive[d] . . . of any counsel.”129  Therefore, a 
complete deprivation equates to absolute prejudice. 
The Campbell court further supported its analysis by addressing the appellate 
waiver.130  Despite the fact that a defendant “waive[d] [his] right to an appeal by 
executing a plea agreement,” the court found that such a waiver was not an 
absolute bar to all appeal rights.131  The court further elucidated on instances 
where a defendant’s appellate rights cannot be waived under a plea agreement: 
(1) when the plea “was not [made] knowing[ly] and voluntarily,” (2) when the 
plea did not follow Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, (3) when the plea 
“was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel,” (4) “an appeal asserting 
that the sentence exceed[ed] the statutory maximum, or [(5)] a challenge 
claiming that the sentence was based on constitutionally impermissible criteria 
like race.”132 
The majority circuits also focused on the duty of defense counsel to his client.  
As the Campbell court stated, “[T]here nevertheless are some instances in which 
defendants seeking an appeal are still entitled to their day in court.  Thus, even 
where an appeal appears frivolous, an attorney’s obligations to his or her client 
do not end at the moment the guilty plea is entered.”133  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court in Flores-Ortega recognized as much.134 
                                                 
assuming, as Campbell claims in his brief, that he did direct his attorney to file a notice of appeal, 
we conclude that Flores-Ortega largely governs this case.” (footnote omitted)). 
 127. Id. at 357 (quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Accord United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that counsel’s failure 
to file a notice of appeal was “professionally unreasonable” according to Flores-Ortega); Sandoval-
Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1196 (using the Court’s reasoning in Flores-Ortega to establish that the attorney 
acted in a professionally unreasonable manner). 
 128. Campbell, 686 F.3d at 358 (quoting Ludwig v. United States, 162 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 
1998)). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 358–60. 
 131. Id. at 358. 
 132. Id. (quoting United States v. Toth, 668 F.3d 374, 377 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 471 & n.5 (6th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000) (“[W]hen counsel’s . . . deficient 
performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, the defendant 
has made out a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim . . . .”). 
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In Garrett, the Tenth Circuit aptly recognized that Flores-Ortega “provided 
[a] bright-line rule[] for evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim based on the 
performance of an attorney who has consulted with a criminal defendant about 
an appeal.”135  As such, under the Sixth and Tenth Circuits’ interpretations, the 
standard Strickland test is unnecessary because Flores-Ortega established an 
analysis specific to when an attorney fails to file a notice of appeal after being 
instructed to do so.136 
The Tenth Circuit anticipated the argument regarding the potential effect its 
holding would have on the efficacy of the criminal justice system, and prudently 
provided guidance on maintaining judicial efficiency without placing an 
absolute bar to defendants who agreed to appellate waivers as part of their 
plea.137  While plea agreements and appellate waivers play a necessary role in 
the legal system and often are enforced, it does not mean that a defendant is 
completely at the mercy of the court when he is sentenced.138  The Tenth Circuit 
implemented an efficient three-pronged test to determine the applicability of a 
defendant’s plea agreement appeal waiver.139  The test analyzes “(1) whether the 
disputed appeal falls within the scope of [the] defendant’s waiver of appellate 
rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate 
rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of 
justice.”140  If the court determines the plea agreement is enforceable, the court 
“will summarily dismiss the appeal without considering its underlying 
merits.”141  If the waiver is found to be unenforceable, then the defendant, whose 
attorney failed to file an appeal, is entitled to a delayed direct appeal.142  The 
courts in Garrett and Campbell did not distinguish Flores-Ortega, even though 
the defendant in Flores-Ortega had not waived his right to appeal, while the 
defendants in both Garrett and Campbell had.143  Both courts analyzed the 
                                                 
 135. United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1265 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Flores-Ortega, 528 
U.S. at 477–78). 
 136. See Campbell, 686 F.3d at 358 (analyzing the impact of Flores-Ortega on the Strickland 
test); Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1265 (reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on 
counsel’s failure to file notice of appeal, using the Flores-Ortega standard rather than the Strickland 
test). 
 137. See Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1266 (discussing the “enforcement test” to determine whether a 
plea agreement should be enforced). 
 138. Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1266 (quoting United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1318 (10th Cir. 
2004)) (“[A] defendant does not subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the whim of the 
district court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (citing Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325). 
 141. Id. (quoting Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1328) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that the 
dismissal of an appeal brought subsequent to an enforceable plea agreement appeal waiver 
“preserves the benefit of the government’s bargain” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 142. Id. at 1263. 
 143. See Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 357–58 (6th Cir. 2012) (“In light of the 
specific propositions of law outlining the obligations of a criminal defense attorney at the appeal 
stage . . . we conclude that Flores–Ortega largely governs this case.”); Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1265 
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constitutional right placed at risk, rather than ignoring the fundamental issue by 
relying on the absence of a factually similar case. 
B.  The Minority Approach Sacrifices Defendants’ Constitutional Rights in the 
Name of Public Policy 
The Third and Seventh Circuits focused on distinguishing their respective 
cases from Flores-Ortega.144  The Seventh Circuit, in Nunez, acknowledged that 
the Court in Flores-Ortega stated that “filing a notice of appeal [was] a purely 
ministerial task, and the failure to file reflect[ed] inattention to the defendant’s 
wishes.”145  However, the Nunez court determined that “[f]iling an appeal [was] 
not ‘ministerial’ when the defendant has waived that entitlement.”146  The Nunez 
court failed to explain why the waiver made the notice of appeal any less of a 
ministerial task than it would be without the waiver.147 
Likewise, the Third Circuit, in Mabry, asserted that the Strickland test “d[id] 
not apply when there [was] an appellate waiver.”148  As for the courts that have 
analogized Flores-Ortega to appellate-waiver cases, the Mabry court rejected 
the majority approach, believing that those courts ignore the existence of the 
appellate waiver.149  While the Nunez and Mabry courts used the guise of 
                                                 
(using Flores-Ortega to analyze the issue before the court).  The court in Campbell recognized that 
the defendant in Flores-Ortega did not waive his right to counsel, but the court dispensed with that 
factual distinction by determining that the legal theory behind the Flores-Ortega holding was 
applicable to the case at bar.  Campbell, 686 F.3d at 357–58.  In Garrett, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis 
made no mention of the fact that Flores-Ortega had not waived his right to appeal.  See Garrett, 
402 F.3d at 1264–67 (finding that the district court’s focus on the defendants waiver “cannot be 
reconciled with the Supreme Court’s holding in Flores-Ortega”). 
 144. See Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing the minor 
exception to Strickland that Flores-Ortega created and the fact that there was no waiver of appellate 
rights in Flores-Ortega); United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that the 
Supreme Court in Flores-Ortega did not state whether the same rationale that gave merit to the 
argument in Flores-Ortega applied to a case “where the defendant has waived his right to appellate 
and collateral review”). 
 145. Nunez, 546 F.3d at 454 (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Ministerial is defined as “[o]f or relating to an act that involves 
obedience to instructions or laws instead of discretion, judgment, or skill,” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1086 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added), and an order to file a notice of appeal meets 
that definition.  However, the Nunez court stated, without any explanation, that the waiver of an 
appeal suddenly converts an otherwise ministerial task into a non-ministerial task.  See Nunez, 546 
F.3d at 454.  The plain definition of ministerial, combined with the lack of a cogent explanation in 
Nunez, leaves this argument with little merit. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. (analogizing filing an appeal after waiving the right to appeal to an attorney preparing 
for trial after his client has pleaded guilty). 
 148. Mabry, 536 F.3d at 241. 
 149. See id. at 242 (stating that the majority courts “fail to address, let alone explain, that there 
even [was] a waiver of collateral attack”).  But see Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 357–
60 (recognizing that Campbell’s plea bargain contained an appellate waiver and discussing why the 
Flores-Ortega reasoning applied even when a waiver existed). 
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enforcing appellate waivers to refute claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
neither court applied a thorough analysis of the Strickland test in reaching its 
decision.150 
Although the Seventh Circuit in Nunez agreed partially with the extension of 
the holding in Flores-Ortega,151 the court ignored the fundamental constitutional 
issue and focused on the fact that Nunez entered the plea knowingly.152  In 
addition, the court determined that Nunez’s allegation met neither prong of the 
Strickland test.153  As to deficient performance, the court focused on the faulted 
premise that adhering to the plea and ignoring the client’s order was objectively 
reasonable.154  In applying the prejudice prong, the court illogically determined 
that, had an appeal been filed, and despite not knowing the basis for any probable 
argument, the court would have dismissed the appeal.155  This ex ante 
determination led the court to believe that the failure to file an appeal was not 
prejudicial.156 
In Mabry, the Third Circuit also chose not to follow the majority approach.157  
The court narrowly interpreted Flores-Ortega and relied on the fact that Flores-
Ortega did not explicitly state the scope of its holding.158  The Mabry court 
believed that applying Flores-Ortega to appellate waiver cases “simply does not 
‘fit.’”159  The court effectively ignored the actual question presented: whether 
defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.160  Instead, it focused 
on the validity of the waiver, namely, “whether enforcing the waiver . . . would 
work a miscarriage of justice.”161  The court justified this approach based on the 
idea that “[w]ithout a waiver, the recognition of a defendant’s right to an appeal 
                                                 
 150. See Nunez, 546 F.3d at 454–55 (discussing defense counsel’s role in protecting the 
benefits that his client received through the plea bargain and, therefore, not providing ineffective 
assistance of counsel when not filing a waived appeal); Mabry, 536 F.3d at 240–41 (stating that 
waivers of appellate rights are constitutional and that an attempt to appeal when one has waived 
said right does not merit the attention that is given to appeals where the defendant has not waived 
his right). 
 151. Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2008) (“There may well be practical 
benefits to the other circuits’ extension of [Flores-Ortega], because waivers of appeal are not 
airtight.”). 
 152. See id. at 452 (“In obtaining Nunez’s assent to these terms on the record, the judge stated 
that the waiver covers every issue other than the voluntariness of the plea.  Asked whether he 
understood this, Nunez replied ‘yes.’”). 
 153. Id. at 456. 
 154. Id. at 453. 
 155. Id. at 456.  The court also stated that Nunez, based on his layman understanding of the 
law, never provided a sufficient ground upon which he would have based his appeal.  Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 241 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 158. See id. at 240 (discussing the limitations of the Court’s decision in Flores-Ortega). 
 159. Id. at 241. 
 160. See id. at 233, 242 (deciding to focus on the “validity of the collateral waiver as a threshold 
issue,” prior to the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
 161. Id. at 242. 
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[was] paramount and counsel’s ineffectiveness clear, for the defendant was 
entitled to an appeal.”162  Therefore, under the Third Circuit’s analysis, the right 
to appeal is essential to an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.163  The 
court also recognized that an appellate waiver made the viability of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim “less than clear,” but the court did not 
explicitly hold such a claim would not survive.164 
The Nunez court’s justification also relied on contract law principles.165  
According to the Seventh Circuit, there is a difference between the reasoning in 
Flores-Ortega that “presume[d] that the defendant ha[d] contested the charges” 
and a situation where the defendant “plead[ed] guilty [and] also waive[d] [his] 
right to appeal.”166  The court reasoned that where the defendant waived his right 
to appeal, his attorney has a duty to protect the benefits of the plea bargain, which 
trumps any duty to file an appeal.167  The Seventh Circuit was primarily referring 
to the government’s leniency that the client may be putting in jeopardy if his 
attorney filed the requested notice of appeal.168  However, an analysis of 
Supreme Court precedent quickly reveals the faults in the Seventh Circuit’s 
reasoning. 
Although the Nunez court presented an argument with some merit, the 
Supreme Court in Flores-Ortega held that whether or not to appeal (or attempt 
to appeal) was ultimately the defendant’s decision.169  Although the Court 
admitted that a defendant’s guilty plea was a relevant factor when analyzing a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, such a factor was not determinative.170  
The argument that the attorney has the final say when the defendant chooses to 
file a notice of appeal is contrary to fundamental Supreme Court precedent that 
dictates that such decisions are left to the defendant.171 
                                                 
 162. Id. at 244. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. (emphasis added) (finding the defendant’s appellate waiver enforceable, and, 
therefore, declining to analyze the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
 165. Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 452–53 (7th Cir. 2008) 
 166. Id. at 454. 
 167. See id. at 455.  Filing an appeal when the defendant has waived his right to do so may 
allow the prosecutor to withdraw the plea bargain.  Id; see also United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 
638, 640 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The only potentially effective remedy when a defendant breaks a promise 
not to appeal is to allow the prosecutor to withdraw some concessions.”). 
 168. Nunez, 546 F.3d at 455 (“[A] defendant has more reason to protest if a lawyer files an 
appeal that jeopardizes the benefit of the bargain than to protest if the lawyer does nothing—for 
‘nothing’ is at least harmless.”).  Cf. United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (“It may be very foolish to risk losing a seven-year plea bargain on an appeal almost 
sure to go nowhere . . . . [n]evertheless the client has the constitutional right . . . .”). 
 169. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000). 
 170. See id. at 480 (discussing the relevance of a defendant’s guilty plea in the Court’s analysis 
of the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
 171. See id. at 485 (“Like the decision whether to appeal, the decision whether to plead guilty 
(i.e., waive trial) rested with the defendant and, like this case, counsel’s advice . . . might have 
caused the defendant to forfeit a judicial proceeding which he was otherwise entitled.”). 
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The Mabry court briefly discussed counsel’s duty to protect the benefits of his 
client’s plea, but the court focused its discussion on the constitutionality of 
appellate waivers.172  The court stated that the waiver of appellate rights 
foreclosed the ability to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.173  The 
only way the defendant could bring such a claim, in the Third Circuit’s opinion, 
would be to challenge the waiver.174  This challenge would require an analysis 
of whether the plea was entered into “knowing[ly] and voluntary[ily],” and 
whether enforcing the waiver would constitute a “miscarriage of justice.”175  The 
Mabry court further supported its position by recognizing that “both [the Third 
Circuit]” and “the Supreme Court have upheld the validity of waivers of rights 
to appeal.”176 
While the Third Circuit cleverly skirted around the ineffective assistance issue 
with some rational arguments, it ignored the actual claim presented.177  The fact 
that the waiver is constitutional is not dispositive of whether counsel’s 
performance met constitutional requirements.178  It is also important to 
distinguish this case from Campbell, Garrett, and even Nunez.  The waiver 
Mabry accepted “waived any right to appeal any conviction and sentence.”179  
Mabry also waived his right “to challenge any conviction or sentence or the 
                                                 
 172. See United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 240–42 (3d Cir. 2008) (deciding that the Third 
Circuit will “consider the validity of the collateral waiver as a threshold issue . . . [and] whether 
enforcing the waiver . . . would work a miscarriage of justice”). 
 173. See id. at 241 (“While a defendant may be entitled to habeas relief if his attorney 
ineffectively fails to file a requested appeal because it is presumed to be prejudicial under Flores-
Ortega, if the same defendant has effectively waived his right to habeas, he cannot even bring such 
a claim . . . .”). 
 174. See id. at 241–42 (stating that the key determination is the waiver’s validity). 
 175. See id. at 241 (explaining the test the courts use to decide if an appellate waiver “pass[es] 
muster”). 
 176. Id. at 242.  In addition, the Third Circuit believed that “the right to appeal that has been 
waived stands on a different footing from a preserved right to appeal, both conceptually and in 
relation to counsel’s duty to his client.”  Id. 
 177. Id. at 233 (reasoning that the real issue was the validity of the waiver and “giving effect 
to the waiver,” as opposed to addressing the ineffective counsel issue). 
 178. See Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven though a 
defendant is clearly entitled to waive the right to an appeal by executing a plea agreement, even the 
broadest waiver does not absolutely foreclose some degree of appellate review.  To the contrary, 
our cases have repeatedly recognized that a waiver can be challenged . . . [if it] ‘was the product of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.’” (quoting United States v. Toth, 668 F.3d 374, 377 (6th Cir. 
2012)). 
 179. Mabry, 536 F.3d at 233 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that 
the waiver included appeals against “a sentence imposed within the mandatory minimum, on any 
and all grounds set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3742] or any other grounds, constitutional or 
nonconstitutional [sic]”).  During the trial, the court asked Mabry if he understood that “unless there 
is an error that results in a miscarriage of justice, [Mabry] will have no right to challenge or appeal 
an incorrect or allegedly incorrect determination of the advisory sentencing guidelines 
imprisonment range made by the [c]ourt . . . . The defendant answered both questions 
affirmatively.”  Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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manner in which the sentence was determined in any collateral proceeding.”180  
However, the defendants in Campbell, Garrett, and Nunez were provided with 
some exceptions in their respective plea agreements.181  While this factual 
difference may justify the result the Third Circuit reached in Mabry, it is also 
essential to distinguish Mabry as an outlier case. 
III.  DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED FOR THE SAKE OF 
JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY 
The majority approach is based on strong constitutional arguments and the 
recognition that it is important to protect the Sixth Amendment’s guarantees.182  
Moreover, it is in accord with recent Supreme Court decisions.183  In Lafler and 
Cooper, for example, the Court indicated a willingness to extend the bounds of 
the Strickland test’s protections, and the majority approach does exactly that—
it broadens Strickland’s applicability.184  The Sixth Amendment also supports 
this approach. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to the 
assistance of counsel.185  Defense counsel “is essential to ensure a fair trial.”186  
ABA standards, which the Supreme Court frequently consults in ineffective 
assistance of counsel cases, state that “[t]he basic duty defense counsel owes . . 
. is to serve as the accused’s counselor and advocate with courage and 
devotion,”187 and advise the accused.188  When defense counsel ignores the direct 
                                                 
 180. Id. at 233 (internal quotation marks omitted).  For a more detailed explanation of the plea 
bargain and appellate waiver, see id. at 234–35.  Mabry signed a letter acknowledging that he 
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the plea bargain.  Id. at 233. 
 181. Campbell, 686 F.3d at 355 n.1 (waiving all appellate rights with the exception of 
challenges that the punishment that exceeds the statutory maximum, “claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel,” voluntariness of the plea, or “prosecutorial misconduct”); Nunez v. United 
States, 546 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2008) (retaining the right to appeal if the sentence “exceeded 
the statutory maximum or the waiver clause itself should be deemed invalid”); United States v. 
Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1263 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2005) (providing Garrett the opportunity to appeal if 
the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or if any Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court case 
changes a law retroactively that applies to Garrett). 
 182. See supra Part II.A. 
 183. See Richard E. Myers II, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Rereading Cronic 
and Strickland in Light of Padilla, Frye, and Lafler, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 229, 238 (2012) (“Taken 
together, Padilla, Frye, and Lafler demonstrate that the Court is endorsing a new set of inquiries 
into counsel’s actions, which opens up the range of cases in which ineffective assistance cases may 
be successful.”). 
 184. See Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1216–17 (2012) (concluding that Lafler and Frye “provide authority for a 
broad construction of the right to effective assistance, such that the right is increasingly regarded 
as valuable for its own sake, and not merely as an adjunct to the fair trial right”). 
 185. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 186. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 851 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 187. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEF. 
FUNCTION 4-1.2, at 120 (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added). 
 188. See id. 4-5.1, at 197. 
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orders of his client, not only does he fail to be a zealous advocate for the 
defendant, but he also goes beyond the role of advisor to that of decision-maker. 
Although the Court gives deference to counsel and their “strategic” 
decisions,189 the ultimate determination of whether “to appeal rests with the 
defendant,” not counsel.190  The defendant has the power to waive a jury trial,191 
to waive the right to the assistance of counsel,192 and to waive the right to a trial 
by accepting a plea bargain.193  Even if a defendant has waived his right to 
appeal, it would be contrary to Supreme Court precedent to allow counsel to 
make the ultimate decision and refuse to file an appeal that the defendant wants 
to file.194  Just as the defendant is the one who must ultimately suffer the 
consequences that may arise from breaching his plea agreement, the defendant 
also bears the risks of not filing an appeal, and, therefore, the defendant is the 
one who should have the power to take that risk.195 
Despite this legally sound and constitutionally supported reasoning, the 
approach has been criticized as encouraging lawyers to file frivolous appeals.196  
Such an argument presumes that all appeals filed with an appellate waiver in 
                                                 
 189. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689–91 (1984) (“[T]he defendant must overcome 
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound 
trial strategy.’” (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 
 190. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000) (emphasis added); see also Jones v. 
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (“It is . . . recognized that the accused has the ultimate authority 
to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a 
jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.”). 
 191. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279–80 (1942) (discussing the 
right of the defendant to determine whether to waive the right to a jury trial and stating that “[t]o 
deny an accused a choice of procedure in circumstances in which he, though a layman, is as capable 
as any lawyer of making an intelligent choice, is to impair the worth of great Constitutional 
safeguards by treating them as empty verbalisms”). 
 192. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (recognizing a defendant’s right to 
waive the assistance of counsel and that “although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to 
his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the 
lifeblood of the law’” (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–51 (1970) (Brennan, J., 
concurring))). 
 193. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (stating that a plea agreement 
waives the “right to a trial by jury, and . . . to confront [the] accusers”). 
 194. See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text. 
 195. See United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating 
that, despite the potential risks of filing an appeal with an appellate waiver in place, defendants 
have the right “to bet on the possibility of winning the appeal and then winning an acquittal, just as 
a poker player has the right to hold the ten and queen of hearts, discard three aces, and pray that 
when he draws three cards, he gets a royal flush”); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEF. FUNCTION 4-5.2, at 199–200 (3d ed. 1993) (“Certain 
decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and others are ultimately 
for defense counsel.  The decisions which are to be made by the accused after full consultation with 
counsel include: (i) what pleas to enter; (ii) whether to accept a plea agreement; (iii) whether to 
waive jury trial; (iv) whether to testify in his or her own behalf; and (v) whether to appeal.”). 
 196. See Kaplan-Marans, supra note 10, at 1204–05 (discussing the decrease in judicial 
efficiency that the majority approach creates). 
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place are without merit.  The fact that some appellate waivers contain exceptions 
supports the proposition that there are non-frivolous grounds upon which a 
defendant may file an appeal after waiving that right.197  Further, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that: 
although showing nonfrivilous grounds for appeal may give weight to 
the contention that the defendant would have appealed, a defendant’s 
inability to “specify the points he would raise were his right to appeal 
reinstated,” will not foreclose the possibility that he can satisfy the 
prejudice requirement where there are other substantial reasons to 
believe that he would have appealed.198 
The term “other substantial reasons” requires a showing that, but-for counsel’s 
failure to file an appeal, the defendant would have appealed.199  Thus, the 
presumption that all appeals filed after a defendant waived his right to appeal 
are frivolous is an argument unsupported by both the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
and the form of the waivers.200 
Similar to the frivolous lawsuits concern is the argument that the majority 
approach decreases judicial efficiency.201  Judicial efficiency, however, should 
not be achieved at the expense of criminal defendants.  Courts frequently take 
actions that decrease judicial efficiency to protect defendants’ rights, such as 
suppressing coerced confessions, even if the trial would proceed more efficiently 
with the confession in evidence.202  Further, seized evidence that is crucial to a 
case may be suppressed if obtained “in violation of the Constitution.”203  These 
actions are taken because of the firmly rooted notion that “[n]othing [will] 
destroy a government more quickly than . . . its disregard of the charter of its 
own existence.”204  The United States’ criminal justice system is built on 
fundamental rights, not judicial efficiency.205  If efficiency were the system’s 
main concern, the Bill of Rights would become superfluous. 
                                                 
 197. See supra note 178. 
 198. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 486 (2000) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 199. Id. at 486. 
 200. See supra Section I.B.2; supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text. 
 201. Gregory P. LaVoy, Neither a “Moose” Nor a “Puppet”: Defining Lawyer’s Role When 
Directed to Pursue an Appeal Notwithstanding a Valid Waiver of Appellate Rights, 7 AVE MARIA 
L. REV. 265, 306 (2008) (“[T]he majority rule developed throughout the federal circuits relies on 
that which is familiar . . . .  And it does so with various social costs to . . . judicial efficiency . . . 
.”). 
 202. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460, 479 (1966) (stating that an “essential 
mainstay of our adversarial system” consists of protection from being compelled to self incriminate, 
and that if a party is not warned of his Fifth Amendment rights, “no evidence obtained as a result 
of interrogation can be used against him”). 
 203. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and 
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”). 
 204. Id. at 659. 
 205. See Kaplan-Marans, supra note 10, at 1206 (recognizing that “maximizing judicial 
efficiency should not trump a defendant’s fundamental rights to due process . . . by denying 
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The majority approach fails to provide an efficient process for separating 
defendants who have valid grounds for appeal from those who do not.206  The 
Supreme Court has recognized the need for processes that protect the rights of a 
defendant without creating an unnecessary burden on the judicial system.207  The 
three-pronged test examined in Garrett is the kind of test that courts should 
adopt because it allows them to quickly analyze and dismiss cases that lack 
merit.208  This process in turn allows efficiency while still prioritizing the 
defendant’s rights.209  The test requires the court to analyze: “(1) whether the 
disputed appeal falls within the scope of defendant’s waiver of appellate rights; 
(2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; 
and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.”210  
Implementing this test would allow a defendant to have a hearing that would 
vindicate his desire for an appeal and determine whether he has a valid appeal 
before adjudicating the merits.211  For defense counsel, it provides a simple way 
to file a notice of appeal, which could quickly be dismissed if it is without merit, 
thereby avoiding a potential claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
IV:  CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Amendment affords criminal defendants the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, defense attorneys are integral to our judicial 
system, and play a significant role in the appellate system.  Under the appellate 
system, a defendant can challenge a conviction by filing a notice of appeal, and 
the judiciary can “check” itself to verify that the defendant has been provided all 
his constitutionally guaranteed rights.  When defense counsel fails to file such 
an appeal, even if the defendant has waived his right to appeal in a plea bargain, 
counsel’s failure robs a defendant of this crucial proceeding.  While defense 
counsel may have a valid argument for “protecting the benefits” a defendant 
received from a plea bargain, a defendant has the right to make the ultimate 
decision to risk those benefits by filing an appeal.  It is not a defense attorney’s 
place to choose what risks a defendant is willing to take.  While it may strain an 
                                                 
defendants the opportunity to appeal” (footnotes omitted)); see, e.g., Maxy v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 569 F. Supp. 2d 720, 722 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (explaining that, in certain cases in which a 
defendant requests issue bifurcation, “the potential prejudice to the defendant outweighed any 
decrease in judicial economy or efficiency”). 
 206. See supra Part II.A; see also supra note 140 and accompanying text (establishing a test 
that could increase efficiency without sacrificing fundamental rights). 
 207. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (“[I]f counsel finds his case to be 
wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request 
permission to withdraw.”). 
 208. See United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that the 
application of the test allows for a “summary and efficient dismissal of a waived appeal”). 
 209. See id. (discussing the benefits of the appellate waiver test). 
 210. Id. (citing United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
 211. See Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1266 (discussing the relevance of the appellate waiver test within 
the defendant’s appeals process). 
2015] Following Orders 513 
already over-burdened system, holding that defense counsel has provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel when failing to follow orders from his client to 
file an appeal, even if his client has waived that right, is the best way to protect 
defendants’ rights and ability to make decisions regarding their own criminal 
proceedings and sentences.  This approach may create risks for defendants, but, 
ultimately, it will protect the guarantee of effective counsel that is at the heart of 
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